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I. INTRODUCTION 
A. The Question of Postpartum Psychosis 
In 1987, Sheryl Massip killed her six-week-old son.  She first 
threw him into oncoming traffic, then hit him on the head, and 
finally ran him over with her own car.1  Prior to these actions, 
Massip had suffered from hallucinations, severe depression, and 
thoughts about suicide.2  She initially claimed that the child had 
been kidnapped, but later admitted to killing him.3  Although a 
California jury found her guilty of second-degree murder,4 the 
judge presiding over the case overturned the verdict two months 
later and entered an acquittal on insanity grounds.5  He required 
Massip to undergo at least one year of outpatient therapy to treat 
the postpartum psychosis,6 even though her symptoms had 
disappeared given the span of time between the death of her son 
and the trial.7  On the prosecution’s appeal, the appellate court 
upheld the judge’s finding of insanity on the basis of postpartum 
psychosis.8 
In 2001, Andrea Yates drowned her five children six months 
after the birth of her youngest child.9  Yates had suffered from a 
history of postpartum illness,10 beginning with voices she heard 
soon after the birth of her first child telling her to stab her 
newborn child.11  Her severe postpartum depression after the birth 
of her fourth child in 1999 led to two suicide attempts and 
subsequent hospitalization.12  After the birth of her fifth child, she 
 
 1. Eric Lichtblau, Appeal Argued in Postpartum Psychosis Case, L.A. TIMES, May 
24, 1990, at B1. 
 2. People v. Massip, 271 Cal. Rptr. 868, 869 (Ct. App. 1990). 
 3. Id. 
 4. Id. 
 5. Id. 
 6. Id. 
 7. CHERYL L. MEYER & MICHELLE OBERMAN, MOTHERS WHO KILL THEIR 
CHILDREN: UNDERSTANDING THE ACTS OF MOMS FROM SUSAN SMITH TO THE “PROM 
MOM” 12 (2001). See Section II.B below for a discussion of the defining 
characteristics of postpartum psychosis. 
 8. Massip, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 869. 
 9. Margaret G. Spinelli, Introduction to INFANTICIDE: PSYCHOSOCIAL AND LEGAL 
PERSPECTIVES ON MOTHERS WHO KILL xvi-xvii (Margaret G. Spinelli, ed., 2003). 
 10. Id. at xvii. 
 11. Id. 
 12. Anne Belli Gesalman, Signs of a Family Feud, NEWSWEEK, Jan. 21, 2002, at 
41. 
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became almost catatonic and was hospitalized again but 
discharged.13  Her physician discontinued her antipsychotic doses.14  
Two weeks later, Yates committed the drownings and then called 
both her husband and the police.15  Although Yates raised an 
insanity defense based on a postpartum psychosis diagnosis, a 
Texas jury found her guilty of five counts of murder, ultimately 
rejecting the death penalty in favor of a life sentence.16 
B. The Questions Postpartum Psychosis Raises 
The women in these cases, the mental illness afflicting them, 
and the differing court and jury treatments they received raise a 
number of questions concerning how society and the law approach 
postpartum illness, particularly postpartum psychosis.  One 
question is how to identify the causes of, define, and delimit the 
boundaries of postpartum illnesses and postpartum psychosis.17  
Another question is how the biological basis of postpartum 
psychosis implicates ideas of feminism, motherhood, and gender 
equity.18  The nature of postpartum psychosis also raises significant 
questions about the present standards of the cognitive test applied 
to the insanity defense in most states, and whether those existing 
legal frameworks adequately capture postpartum psychosis or 
whether they create a gap through which women suffering from 
postpartum illness fall.19 
C. Potential Solutions to the Criminal Treatment of Postpartum Psychosis 
This article will address these questions and explore a variety 
of solutions to the problem of addressing postpartum psychosis.  
One solution is to maintain the status quo system.20  This “solution” 
determines that defendants suffering from postpartum psychosis 
who meet the high bar of the cognitive test for successfully raising 
an insanity defense are properly excluded from punishment, but 
 
 13. Spinelli, supra note 9, at xvii. 
 14. Id. 
 15. Cheryl L. Meyer & Margaret G. Spinelli, Medical and Legal Dilemmas of 
PostPartum Psychiatric Disorders, in INFANTICIDE: PSYCHOSOCIAL AND LEGAL 
PERSPECTIVES ON MOTHERS WHO KILL, supra note 9, at 176. 
 16. Spinelli, supra note 9, at xvii. 
 17. See infra Part II. 
 18. See infra Part III. 
 19. See infra Part IV. 
 20. See infra Part V.A. 
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those who do not meet the test are properly located within the 
existing criminal justice system.  An alternative approach is to 
implement statutory provisions such as those enacted in the United 
Kingdom and many European countries, which provide for lesser 
charges or sentencing for crimes committed by women within a 
certain time period after the birth of a child.21  Another option is to 
implement a different version of the insanity test for postpartum 
psychosis based on the unique characteristics of the illness and the 
limited pool of individuals who can have this mental illness.22  The 
last option this article discusses is to keep postpartum psychosis 
cases within the criminal system, but to either reduce the criminal 
sentence or remove the sentencing phase to the mental health 
treatment system rather than working within the present system of 
incarceration.23 
II. IDENTIFYING AND DEFINING POSTPARTUM PSYCHOSIS 
A. A Brief History of Postpartum Illness 
Diagnoses of postpartum illness stem from as far back as 
Hippocrates in the fourth century, B.C., who noted in one woman 
recently delivered of twins a “severe case of insomnia and 
restlessness that began on the sixth day” after the birth.24  
Postpartum illness falls along a spectrum researchers have divided 
into three different categories: postpartum blues, postpartum 
depression, and postpartum psychosis.25 
B. Types of Postpartum Illness 
Postpartum blues, otherwise known as “baby blues”26 or 
“maternity blues,”27  affects between an estimated twenty-five to 
 
 21. See infra Part V.B. 
 22. See infra Part V.C. 
 23. See infra Part V.D. 
 24. See SHARON L. ROAN, POSTPARTUM DEPRESSION: EVERY WOMAN’S GUIDE TO 
DIAGNOSIS, TREATMENT & PREVENTION 24 (1997). 
 25. Velma Dobson & Bruce Sales, The Science of Infanticide and Mental Illness, 6 
PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 1098, 1104 (2000). 
 26. Michael O’Hara, Post-partum “Blues,” Depression, and Psychosis: A Review, 7 J. 
PSYCHOSOMATIC OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY 205, 206 (1987). 
 27. Michael L. Perlin, “She Breaks Just Like a Little Girl”: Neonaticide, the Insanity 
Defense, and the Irrelevance of “Ordinary Common Sense,” 10 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 
1, 14-15 (2003). 
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eighty-five percent of women during the first six to eight weeks 
after they deliver a child.28  Because this condition occurs so 
commonly, physicians, psychiatrists, and laypeople alike consider it 
a “normal” part of the childbirth process.29  Its impact is largely 
“trivial” and “fleeting,”30 involving a range of minor presentations 
of irritability, diminished appetite, mood swings, crying jags, 
anxiety, disorientation, and fatigue,31 usually beginning the first few 
days after childbirth and rarely continuing past two weeks.32  
Postpartum blues do not impair a woman’s sense of judgment, and, 
as mentioned, are considered a normal element of the childbirth 
process and not a mental disorder or a disease.33 
Postpartum depression affects between an estimated five to 
twenty percent of new mothers.34  Postpartum depression is 
considered to be a “clinical depression occurring during the weeks 
and months following childbirth.”35  It usually appears within the 
first six months following childbirth.36  It presents symptoms 
including disinterest, sleep problems, fatigue, decision-making 
difficulties, guilt, thoughts of suicide, feelings of inadequacy and 
hopelessness, and lack of love for the new child.37 
Postpartum psychosis occurs much more rarely—one or two of 
every thousand new mothers,38 or approximately 0.2% of new 
mothers, will have episodes of psychosis in which they experience 
delusions or hallucinations, severe depression, disordered thought 
 
 28. Dobson & Sales, supra note 25, at 1104. The range of women postpartum 
blues affects varies widely from study to study.  One study places the range at fifty 
to eighty percent.  Anne Damante Brusca, Postpartum Psychosis: A Way Out for 
Murderous Moms?, 18 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1133, 1133 (1990).  Another lists the range 
at fifty percent.  Brice Pitt, Maternity Blues, 122 BRIT. J. PSYCHIATRY 431, 433 (1973). 
 29. Brusca, supra note 28, at 1141. 
 30. Id. 
 31. Dobson & Sales, supra note 25, at 1104; Jessie Manchester, Beyond 
Accommodation: Reconstructing the Insanity Defense to Provide an Adequate Remedy for 
Postpartum Psychotic Women, 93 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 713, 719 (2003). 
 32. Dobson & Sales, supra note 25, at 1104; Manchester, supra note 31, at 719. 
 33. O’Hara, supra note 26, at 207-09. 
 34. Some sources estimate ten to fifteen percent of new mothers develop 
postpartum depression.  Brusca, supra note 28, at 1143; O’Hara, supra note 26, at 
210.  Another study estimates between five and twenty percent.  Dobson & Sales, 
supra note 25, at 1105. 
 35. Dobson & Sales, supra note 25, at 1105. 
 36. MEYER & OBERMAN, supra note 7, at 77. 
 37. Brusca, supra note 28, at 1143; Dobson & Sales, supra note 25, at 1105; 
O’Hara, supra note 26, at 217. 
 38. MEYER & OBERMAN, supra note 7, at 12. 
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processes, and deviant behavior.39  Some disordered thought 
processes expressed by mothers suffering from postpartum 
psychosis include seeing a room upside down, fearing conspiracies 
to kill her child, and obsessive thoughts about ways in which to 
harm the child herself.40  Postpartum psychosis typically arises 
within the first two weeks after childbirth, and it generally requires 
hospitalization and aggressive medical treatment.41 
C. Postpartum Psychosis as a Mental Disorder 
Postpartum psychosis is not categorized in the Diagnostic and 
Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders–Fourth Edition (DSM-IV) as 
its own diagnosis.42  Instead, it is included within the general “mood 
disorders” category,43 and is not considered, within the DSM-IV, to 
be distinguishable from non-postpartum psychoses,44 although the 
DSM-IV does refer to a “postpartum onset specifier.”45  The DSM-IV 
states that the symptoms of postpartum depression do “not differ 
from the symptomatology in nonpostpartum mood episodes and 
may include psychotic features.”46  As an affective disorder, 
postpartum psychosis is cyclical and can reoccur with subsequent 
pregnancies.47  An estimated one in seven to one in four 
subsequent pregnancies can spark another postpartum psychotic 
episode.48  The fact that postpartum psychosis does not appear in 
the DSM-IV as a separate condition is problematic because it does 
not separate the psychosis from other psychotic disorders.49 
 
 39. KATHARINA DALTON, DEPRESSION AFTER CHILDBIRTH 84-90 (3rd ed. 1996); 
MEYER & OBERMAN, supra note 7, at 12; Dobson & Sales, supra note 25, at 1106. 
 40. Michele Connell, The Postpartum Psychosis Defense and Feminism: More or Less 
Justice for Women?, 53 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 143, 146 (2002) (summarizing patient 
stories in DALTON, supra note 39). 
 41. DALTON, supra note 39, at 85; Dobson & Sales, supra note 25, at 1106-22. 
 42. Connell, supra note 40, at 146. 
 43. Manchester, supra note 31, at 722. 
 44. O’Hara, supra note 26, at 217. 
 45. Manchester, supra note 31, at 722. 
 46. AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL 
DISORDERS 386 (4th ed. 1998). 
 47. Brusca, supra note 28, at 1145. 
 48. Id. at 1146. 
 49. One commentator suggests that this failure to categorize postpartum 
psychosis as a separate disorder reflects how “male-centered models” of medicine, 
law, and language marginalize women suffering from postpartum disorders and 
fail to recognize the medical attention they require.  Laura E. Reece, Comment, 
Mothers Who Kill: Postpartum Disorders and Criminal Infanticide, 38 UCLA L. REV. 699, 
710-11 (1991). 
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D. The Uncertain Cause(s) of Postpartum Psychosis 
One problem is that the exact cause of postpartum illness, 
including postpartum psychosis, has not yet been determined, and 
medical experts do not agree on its possible causes.50  Hippocrates 
attributed it to an “excessive blood flow to the brain.”51  At the time 
of the Infanticide Act of 1938 in the United Kingdom, physicians 
explained the disorder as the effect of lactation52creating hormonal 
aftereffects to the labor and delivery process.53  Other studies have 
pointed to the endocrinal changes in the body following pregnancy 
and childbirth,54 the levels of progesterone, estradiol, and estrogen 
in the body,55 or the changes in tryptophan metabolism,56 but these 
results have been inconclusive.57 
An additional complication for postpartum psychosis is the 
role external aggravating factors can have.  Some studies have 
shown that, for instance, “the level of support that the mother 
receives from the father and family” during the months following 
the birth of a child is “more determinative” of postpartum 
depression than other demographic or biological factors.58  One 
study has noted that mothers suffering from postpartum psychosis 
generally fit the mold of “devoted mothers,”59 but an obsession with 
being a “good mother” causes insecurity about “who they are and 
their parenting ability” that becomes a severe delusion and slips 
into a psychosis.60  Another study has found that “prepregnancy 
stressors such as unplanned pregnancy, marital discord, poor 
identity with the mother, prenatal anxiety, and emotional 
problems” may be contributing factors, but “do not by themselves 
 
 50. Connell, supra note 40, at 148. 
 51. Meyer & Spinelli, supra note 15, at 168. 
 52. Katherine O’Donovan, The Medicalisation of Infanticide, 1984 CRIM. L. REV. 
259, 261 (1984). 
 53. Id. at 262. 
 54. DALTON, supra note 39, at 68. 
 55. J.B. Murray & L. Gallahue, Postpartum Depression, 113 GENETIC SOC. & GEN. 
PSYCHOL. MONOGRAPHS 193, 203 (1987). 
 56. Reece, supra note 49, at 713. 
 57. Steven Lee, Postpartum Emotional Disorders, 1984 MED. TRIAL TECH. 286, 291 
(1984). 
 58. O’Hara, supra note 26, at 214. 
 59. Susan Ayres, “[N]ot a Story to Pass On”: Constructing Mothers Who Kill, 15 
HASTINGS WOMEN’S L.J. 39, 107 (2004) (quoting interview with Cheryl Meyer from 
60 Minutes (CBS television broadcast Dec. 9, 2001)). 
 60. Id. 
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account for the etiology of postpartum mental disorders.”61  It 
remains unclear, however, whether social support structures can 
actually prevent postpartum mental illness, or whether such 
structures “simply protect[] mothers and their children against the 
potential threat posed by such illnesses.”62  Postpartum psychosis is 
also “quite difficult to treat.”63 
III. SITUATING POSTPARTUM PSYCHOSIS IN THE CONTEXT OF 
CONCEPTS OF MOTHERHOOD AND FEMINIST THEORY 
A. Perceptions of Motherhood—Good, Bad, and Mad 
Historically, women, at least in European and American 
society, have been defined along one of two binaries—either as the 
“temptress” figure, or as a pure mother figure64—the Eve and the 
Madonna.  The mother figure encompasses a certain set of 
attributes—namely self-sacrifice, compassion, and caring65—that 
define her as a “good mother” and, synonymously, a “good 
woman.”66 
Such treatment of women suffering from postpartum 
psychosis—or even women who commit infanticide for other 
reasons—continues today.  Often, the media—and the jury—judge 
a woman who has killed her child or children while suffering from 
postpartum psychosis along preconceived ideas of “good” or “bad” 
womanhood.  One commentator has posited that the killing of 
one’s child is an extreme social transgression because an 
“infanticidal mother directly challenges male authority, and the 
male-dominant family structure.”67  Such a challenge requires a 
 
 61. Brusca, supra note 28, at 1146-47.  See also John J. Harding, Postpartum 
Psychiatric Disorders: A Review, 30 COMPREHENSIVE PSYCHOL. 109, 109-12 (1989); 
Valerie Thurtle, Post-natal Depression: The Relevance of Sociological Approaches, 22 J. 
ADVANCED NURSING 416, 416-24 (1995). 
 62. Michelle Oberman, “Lady Madonna, Children at Your Feet”: Tragedies at the 
Intersection of Motherhood, Mental Illness and the Law, 10 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 
33, 35 (2003). 
 63. Id. at 40. 
 64. LITA LINZER SCHWARTZ & NATALIE K. ISSER, ENDANGERED CHILDREN: 
NEONATICIDE, INFANTICIDE, AND FILICIDE 3 (2000); Sandy Meng Shan Liu, 
Postpartum Psychosis: A Legitimate Defense for Negating Criminal Responsibility?, 4 
SCHOLAR 339, 377 (2002). 
 65. SCHWARTZ & ISSER, supra note 64, at 3; Liu, supra note 64, at 377. 
 66. SCHWARTZ & ISSER, supra note 64, at 3; Liu, supra note 64, at 377. 
 67. Karen Lewicki, Can You Forgive Her?: Legal Ambivalence Toward Infanticide, 8 
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mother to be defined in a binary way—either mad or bad.68  
Women who generally conform to stereotypical gender norms but 
who commit the crime of killing their children are seen as “mad,” 
whereas women who do not conform to such norms and kill their 
children are seen as “bad.”69  A mother society views (or the press 
depicts) as bad generally receives a more severe sentence than does 
a mother society views as mad in this context.70 
During the Yates trial, for instance, the press focused heavily 
on how Yates had been an “ideal” wife and mother prior to the 
murders.  She was a housewife who was caring for and home-
schooling her five children.  She was also caring for her father, who 
was afflicted with Alzheimer’s.  In a 60 Minutes interview, her 
husband noted that “she’s a terrific mother that loved the 
children,” and commentator Ed Bradley noted that the Yateses 
looked “like a normal, happy family.”71  Susan Ayres sees such 
comments and such an opinion of Yates as a superb mother as 
“specularizing” her in a projection of the male ego,72 as an ideal 
mother figure.  She comments that the media circuses surrounding 
postpartum psychosis infanticides tend to focus on those mothers 
who were “unlikely candidates to kill their children”73 because they 
are not “bad,” not underprivileged, and not “mad” other than the 
manifestation of postpartum psychosis.74  The effect such 
stereotypes and preconceptions about womanhood and 
motherhood have on how women suffering from postpartum 
psychosis are perceived add to the complexity of how postpartum 
psychosis should be treated within the legal system. 
B. Feminist Theory Positions on Assimilation and Difference 
Some commentators have argued that accommodating 
postpartum psychosis as a legitimate defense that should merit 
“special treatment” recognizes the difference between men and 
 
S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 683, 685 (1999). 
 68. Ayres, supra note 59, at 58-59. 
 69. Perlin, supra note 27, at 11.  See also SCHWARTZ & ISSER, supra note 58, at 3. 
 70. Ayres, supra note 59, at 72 (citing Michelle Oberman, Understanding 
Infanticide in Context: Mothers Who Kill, 1870-1930 and Today, 92 J. CRIM. L. & 
CRIMINOLOGY 707, 714 (2002)). 
 71. Id. at 105. 
 72. Id. 
 73. Id. at 106. 
 74. Id. at 106-07. 
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women in far-reaching and detrimental ways.  Focusing on these 
differences allows the legal resolution of “matters of great 
importance and complexity by the simplistic, reflexive assertion 
that women and men are ‘simply not similarly situated.’”75  Patricia 
Pearson suggests that focusing on special treatment for women 
ultimately will result in diminished rights for women.76  She notes 
that postpartum psychosis was used as a nineteenth-century 
rationale for denying women the vote.77 
Other commentators have suggested that such an approach 
would threaten to treat women in general as “less than fully 
competent legal citizens.”78  Commentator Anne Coughlin, for 
instance, argues that creating a difference in treatment of men and 
women can deny women the “same capacity for self-governance 
that is attributed to men.”79  “The experience of the responsible 
actor is one that resonates powerfully in our culture and, by 
securing an excuse, women assure that it is one that will continue 
to be denied to them,” she claims.80  Dorothy Roberts argues that a 
defense based on a mental disorder experienced only by women 
“risk[s] misdiagnosing the causes of some women’s crimes.”81  
Further, Deborah Denno points out that using a “gender-based 
standard for punishment or defenses would most likely incorporate 
gender difference[s] in the prevalence or prediction of crime,”82 
creating a system of profiling that would work to the detriment of 
women by “perpetuat[ing] sexism and negative stereotypes of 
women.”83 
In part, these arguments reflect concerns about medicalizing 
women’s negative experiences within an oppressive social system.  
 
 75. Connell, supra note 40, at 166 (quoting Wendy W. Williams, The Equality 
Crisis: Some Reflections on Culture, Courts, and Feminism, 14 WOMEN’S RTS. L. REP. 151, 
164 (1992)). 
 76. Id. at 167 (citing PATRICIA PEARSON, WHEN SHE WAS BAD: VIOLENT WOMEN 
AND THE MYTH OF INNOCENCE 91 (Viking Penguin 1997)). 
 77. Id. 
 78. Oberman, supra note 62, at 66. 
 79. Anne M. Coughlin, Excusing Women, 82 CAL. L. REV. 1, 6 (1994), cited in 
Oberman, supra note 62, at 66 n.199. 
 80. Id. at 25, cited in Oberman, supra note 62, at 66 n.199. 
 81. Dorothy E. Roberts, The Meaning of Gender Equality in Criminal Law, 85 J. 
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1, 10 (1994). 
 82. Manchester, supra note 31, at 748-49 (quoting Deborah W. Denno, 
Gender, Crime, and the Criminal Law Defenses, 85 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 80, 123 
(1994)). 
 83. Id. at 749; Roberts, supra note 81, at 2. 
10
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Roberts argues that women should not need to claim insanity 
simply because “the law does not recognize the stifling social 
conditions that contributed to their criminal acts.”84  Within this 
“stifling” legal system, a postpartum psychosis defense claim 
“reflects society’s reluctance to address women’s problems unless 
they are explained as illnesses.”85 
These arguments for an assimilative approach would not 
permit a different treatment of women suffering from postpartum 
psychosis than that of any other defendant suffering from a 
psychotic disorder.  They argue an assimilative approach is 
necessary, in order to avoid implicating gender difference as a 
rationale for creating other legally recognized differences to the 
detriment of women, to avoid a presumption of insanity or mental 
instability among women who recently have gone through 
childbirth, and to avoid characterizing social problems and 
inequities as mental or medical problems and thereby evading the 
need to improve social structures for women. 
The problem with such an approach is that it assumes a level 
playing field between the genders when, in fact, the present system 
is not level at all.  “If the current standard by which women are 
being judged is resulting in injustice,” one commentator argues, 
“then correcting that standard does not mean that women are 
treated more leniently than men.  It means that they are treated 
equally.”86  The purpose of gender sameness assumes an element of 
absurdity when the center of controversy is a mental disorder that 
someone can experience only when she has given birth—
something out of the realm of possibility for men.  So when the 
media covering the Yates case talked of her psychosis as 
“transcend[ing] gender,”87 one commentator notes, “to argue that 
the Yates case ‘transcends gender’ is to miss the basic point that 
Andrea Yates’ defense depends upon a female-specific psychiatric 
condition.”88 
In addition, one area in which the law specifically 
acknowledges a difference between men and women is precisely in 
the pregnancy arena.  Women who are pregnant or who have 
 
 84. Roberts, supra note 81, at 11. 
 85. Id. 
 86. Connell, supra note 40, at 167. 
 87. Id. at 153 (quoting Sally Satel, The Newest Feminine Icon—A Killer Mom, 
WALL ST. J., Sept. 11, 2001, at A26). 
 88. Id. 
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recently given birth are given “special treatment” that, in actuality, 
levels the playing field by placing their employment situation on a 
par with that of men through the Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 
1978, for instance.89  The Act states that “women affected by 
pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions shall be 
treated the same for all employment-related purposes.”90  It is the 
recognition and specific treatment of the difference between the 
genders that allows for the sameness of the result.  From this 
perspective, recognizing a related difference in postpartum 
psychosis—also affecting women who recently have experienced 
the childbirth process—is not a significant carve-out in gender 
difference.  In addition, there is no “slippery slope” because the 
women who could come within this legal carve-out constitute a very 
small pool bounded by very specific criteria. 
IV. POSTPARTUM PSYCHOSIS AND ITS PRESENT RELATIONSHIP TO THE 
INSANITY DEFENSE 
Societal and legal treatment of infanticide in general changes 
like “a roller coaster—moving from a lenient-to-moderate period to 
a severe period, then changing to a very lenient period . . . .”91  In 
recent years, however, juries have shown less leniency than earlier 
in the century.92 
The majority of states employ a cognitive test for determining 
whether or not someone is legally insane as a defense against a 
criminal charge.  About half of the states employ the M’Naghten 
test, which requires a showing that, at the time of the criminal 
offense, the mental disease or disorder in question prevented the 
defendant from knowing the nature or quality of her act, or 
knowing the wrongfulness of her act.93  About half of the states use 
the American Law Institute (ALI) test, by which the defendant is 
considered insane if, at the time of the offense, as a result of 
mental disease or defect he lacked substantial capacity either to 
appreciate the criminality/wrongfulness of his conduct or to 
 
 89. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (2000). 
 90. Id. § 2000e(k). 
 91. Norman J. Finkel et. al., Commonsense Judgments of Infanticide: Murder, 
Manslaughter, Madness, or Miscellaneous?, 6 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 1113, 1115 
(2000). 
 92. Ayres, supra note 59, at 72. 
 93. RICHARD MORAN, KNOWING RIGHT FROM WRONG: THE INSANITY DEFENSE OF 
DANIEL MCNAUGHTAN 2 (1981). 
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conform his conduct to the requirements of the law.94  Although 
the use of “appreciate” as opposed to “know” appears to lower the 
bar somewhat from an “all or nothing” approach to cognition, it 
still creates a gap between the manifestation of postpartum 
psychosis and the requirements of the cognitive test. 
A key problem is that postpartum psychosis may significantly 
impair a woman’s mental stability while still not rising to the level 
of an irresistible impulse—thereby not meeting a volitional test, 
should it apply—and still not meeting the cognitive test required 
under most states to qualify as an insanity defense.  Nearly all 
postpartum psychosis sufferers understand the moral wrongness of 
killing their child(ren).95  At the same time, “[t]here seldom is any 
real doubt as to the mental instability of mothers who kill their 
children while suffering from postpartum psychosis or profound 
postpartum depression.”96 
John Hinckley Jr.’s attempted assassination of President 
Ronald Reagan and his subsequent acquittal by reason of insanity 
led many states to adopt a narrow understanding of the insanity 
defense.  For instance, Idaho, which previously followed the ALI 
rule, eliminated the insanity defense altogether after Hinckley’s 
acquittal.97  As a result of such narrow interpretations of the 
insanity defense, “[m]ore likely than not, women suffering from 
postpartum mental illness will not be sick enough to have their 
crimes or mistakes excused . . . .”98 
Texas law, for instance, recognizes only a narrow definition of 
the insanity defense.99  The prosecutor needs to establish only that 
the defendant knew the difference between right and wrong.100  
This became easy for the prosecutor to establish in the Yates case 
because she herself called the police after drowning her children to 
report the act.101  Four of the jurors in the case who were later 
interviewed noted that Yates’ confession indicated that she was 
 
 94. Id. 
 95. Oberman, supra note 62, at 38. 
 96. Id. at 47. 
 97. Jessie Manchester, Comment, Beyond Accommodation: Reconstructing the 
Insanity Defense to Provide an Adequate Remedy for Postpartum Psychotic Women, 93 J. 
Crim. L. & Criminology 713, 746 (2003); see also IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-207 (2005). 
 98. Oberman, supra note 62, at 63. 
 99. Reanta Salecl, The Real of Crime: Psychoanalysis and Infanticide, 24 CARDOZO 
L. REV. 2467, 2467 (2003). 
 100. Id. 
 101. Spinelli, supra note 9, at 174-75. 
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“thinking pretty clearly” and “didn’t sound psychotic,”102 that she 
planned to kill the children the night before,103 and that her call to 
police after she had drowned them showed “she knew exactly what 
she was doing . . . [a]nd she knew it was wrong, or she would not 
have called the police.”104  The fact that psychiatrists called as 
expert witnesses for both the defense and the prosecution agreed 
that she suffered from severe psychosis was inconsequential under 
Texas law.105 
The overarching problem is that the law offers a relatively 
binary approach to insanity and its role within criminal law.  One is 
either “sane or insane, competent or incompetent, or able-bodied 
or disabled” under the present legal system, one commentator 
notes.106  As a result, the system “simply fails to accommodate the 
vast majority of women who struggle with postpartum mental 
illness.”107 
V. POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS TO THE PROBLEM OF SITUATING 
POSTPARTUM PSYCHOSIS WITHIN CRIMINAL LAW 
A. Maintaining the Existing System 
One solution is to say that no “solution” at all is necessary 
because there is no real “problem.”  Postpartum psychosis is simply 
one of a variety of psychotic disorders and should not be treated in 
a way that differs from other disorders that could allow a defendant 
to raise an insanity defense.  Such an approach would also fall in 
line with the assimilation feminist view by not highlighting gender 
difference.108  The problem with this approach is that it does not 
recognize the unique nature of postpartum psychosis as a disorder 
that affects only women, and only women who have just had a 
child. 
 
 102. Lisa Teachey, Jurors Say they Believed Yates Knew Right from Wrong, HOUS. 
CHRON., Mar. 18, 2002, at 1A. 
 103. Id. 
 104. Id. 
 105. Salecl, supra note 99, at 2467. 
 106. Oberman, supra note 62, at 33. 
 107. Id. 
 108. Id. at 63 n.189. 
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B. Statutory Resolution—Automatic Presumption of Insanity 
England, Canada, Australia, and some other European 
countries have statutes that acknowledge the potential effects of 
postpartum depression and psychosis on new mothers.  The 
Australian Infanticide Act of 1938, for instance, addresses the 
killing of children under one year of age.109  The English 
Infanticide Act of 1938 allows the jury to reduce the sentence of a 
woman who kills her child under a year old from murder to 
manslaughter,110 and generally results in probation.111  The statute 
states: 
Where a woman by any wilful act or omission causes the 
death of her child being a child under the age of twelve 
months, but at the time of the act or omission the balance 
of her mind was disturbed by reason of her not having 
fully recovered from the effect of giving birth to the child 
or by reason of the effect of lactation consequent upon 
the birth of the child, then, notwithstanding that the 
circumstances were such that but for this Act the offence 
would have amounted to murder, she shall be guilty of 
felony, to wit of infanticide, and may for such offence be 
dealt with and punished as if she had been guilty of the 
offence of manslaughter of the child.112 
In Sweden, these sorts of cases go before a panel of medical 
doctors rather than enter the criminal justice system at all.113 
Such an approach recognizes that postpartum psychosis afflicts 
only women and that these women, while not “insane” in the 
traditional sense of the term, have a severe mental condition that, 
at the very least, reduces their culpability in the criminal act of 
killing their infant children.  Yet some commentators have noted 
that because the English statute requires no causality between the 
mental disorder and the killing of the child, “it practically 
constitutes a per se defense to any killing that occurs within one 
 
 109. Bernadette McSherry, The Return of the Raging Hormones Theory: 
Premenstrual Syndrome, Postpartum Disorders and Criminal Responsibility, 15 SYDNEY L. 
REV. 292, 304 (1993). 
 110. Kimberly Waldron, Postpartum Psychosis as an Insanity Defense, 21 RUTGERS 
L.J. 669, 679 (1990).  For a relatively complete list of countries that recognize the 
killing of a child soon after birth as a less culpable category of homicide, see 
Oberman, supra note 62, at 45 n.76. 
 111. Oberman, supra note 62, at 45. 
 112. Infanticide Act, 1938, 1 & 2 Geo. 6, c. 36, § 1 (Eng.). 
 113. Oberman, supra note 62, at 45. 
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year of birth.”114  This disconnect between the disorder and the 
crime is problematic because postpartum psychosis is only one of a 
number of different reasons researchers have found for why new 
mothers kill their infant children.115  Another problem with such an 
approach is that it assumes that all women after childbirth are, to 
some extent, insane116 and not fully culpable for their actions.  Such 
a perspective could open doors to extending this perspective to 
other arenas, as per Pearson’s argument,117 or to impacting 
perceptions about the mental inferiority or fragility of women as 
compared to that of men. 
C. Creating a New Test for Postpartum Psychosis 
Some commentators have suggested creating a new insanity 
test to apply exclusively to postpartum psychosis.  One 
commentator has proposed the following standard, which is a 
modified version of the Irresistible Impulse Test:118 
1. Affirmative defense: The defendant can raise the 
affirmative defense of insanity based on postpartum 
psychosis if: 
a.) the killing of the defendant’s child occurred 
within one year of the mother giving birth to that 
child or another child, and 
b.) an expert psychiatrist appointed by the court 
determines that there is a reasonable doubt as to the 
defendant’s sanity. 
2. Elements: The defendant must prove, to the extent 
determined by state law, that: 
a.) she was suffering from postpartum psychosis, and 
b.) there was a causal connection between the 
psychosis and the killing, and 
c.) she did not know right from wrong, or, if she did 
 
 114. Connell, supra note 40, at 164; see also Waldron, supra note 110, at 679 
(explaining that the Infanticide Act allowed a woman to be guilty of infanticide 
rather than first degree murder without establishing that the disorder was severe 
enough to affect her self-control or responsibility). 
 115. MEYER & OBERMAN, supra note 7, at 36-38; Oberman, supra note 62, at 36. 
 116. Debora K. Dimino, Postpartum Depression: A Defense for Mothers Who Kill 
Their Infants, 30 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 231, 257 (1990). 
 117. See supra Part III.B. 
 118. Connell, supra note 40, at 162-63. 
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know right from wrong, then she must prove that 
because of the psychosis, she had lost the ability to 
choose between right and wrong.119 
This test has a few advantages over the present system and over 
the statutes such as England’s Infanticide Act.120  Like the 
Infanticide Act, it has a temporal requirement that fits the 
parameters of the onset of postpartum psychosis–no more than one 
year after the birth of a child.121  It also applies only to the killing of 
the defendant’s child.  Unlike the Infanticide Act, however, the 
proposed test requires a causal connection between postpartum 
psychosis and the killing of the child.  This addresses much of the 
objection to those statutes. 
Such a test would have the advantage of recognizing (i) the 
effects postpartum psychosis have on women and their actions, and 
(ii) the failure of the cognitive test to capture the disorder.  It 
would not offer a per se assumption of insanity, as statutes like 
England’s Infanticide Act do, but it would bridge the gap between 
the present requirements of the cognitive test and the effects of 
postpartum psychosis. 
One issue is that having this test emphasizes the differences 
between women and men and the treatment of psychiatric 
disorders affecting them.  This treatment elicits the arguments 
some feminist scholars have made against emphasizing differences 
and thereby raises the possibility of other disparate gender 
treatment. 
Another issue with this sort of new test for postpartum 
psychosis is that it opens the door for creating disorder-by-disorder 
tests rather than an “insanity defense” test.  Such an approach may 
not, in fact, be a “problem” per se.  Such an approach would bring 
the legal treatment of mental illnesses and disorders more in line 
with the mental health system’s treatment and presumably would 
eliminate the binary legal system in place now.  The problem with 
such an approach is that it creates a case-by-case basis for 
determining criminal culpability instead of a bright-line rule that 
would generate more conformity across cases.  In addition, given 
the public’s suspicion of the insanity defense in general and the 
worry that each disorder would receive individualized treatment 
 
 119. Id. 
 120. See supra Part V.B. 
 121. Connell, supra note 40, at 163. 
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that likely would not create uniformity across cases, it is unlikely 
that such an approach would be feasible. 
D. Offering Alternative Sentencing Options 
1. Containment Within the Criminal System, but Lighter Sentencing 
Some courts and prosecutors have not accepted postpartum 
psychosis or depression as a complete insanity defense to murder, 
but they have used it as a key mitigating factor in the sentencing 
phase to acknowledge the unique and temporary nature of the 
mental disorder.122  In 2002, for instance, a Virginia woman pled 
guilty to involuntary manslaughter as a result of her postpartum 
psychosis, and her five-year sentence was suspended in recognition 
of the unique and temporary nature of her condition.123 
By and large, this sort of approach requires an 
acknowledgment of postpartum psychosis as creating diminished 
capacity, rather than as a fully exonerating defense.  It reduces the 
level of criminal responsibility, recognizing that recidivism is not 
likely to be a problem, but it still accomplishes the goal of 
retributivism.  It can result in a lesser prison sentence rather than a 
longer commitment in a mental institution should an insanity 
defense be successful.124  In effect, it is what Stephen Morse sees as a 
punishment meted out in proportion to what is deserved, rather 
than a fixed and absolute punishment for a specific criminal act.125 
2. Mental Treatment Instead of Serving Time in Prison 
Another solution is to shift postpartum psychosis to treatment 
within the mental health system rather than incarceration within 
the criminal system.  This is what a “guilty but mentally ill” (GBMI) 
verdict functionally prescribes.  At the time of sentencing, the court 
would determine whether or not the defendant needs mental 
treatment.  It could recommend probation with mandatory 
treatment, or it could eschew probation in favor of 
 
 122. Dimino, supra note 116, at 244. 
 123. Oberman, supra note 62, at 42 n.64 (citing Maria Glod, No Prison Term in 
Man’s Slaying; Fairfax Wife Had Postpartum Psychosis, WASH. POST, July 26, 2002, at 
B7). 
 124. Liu, supra note 64, at 375. 
 125. Stephen J. Morse, Justice, Mercy and Craziness, 36 STAN. L. REV. 1485, 1493-
94 (1984) (book review). 
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institutionalization at a mental treatment facility.126  The defendant 
would serve the time of the sentence either in the treatment facility 
or, when treatment becomes unnecessary, in prison. 
Such an approach might better serve postpartum psychosis 
defendants because it emphasizes the treatment of the disorder 
rather than incarceration.  The problem is that postpartum 
psychosis affects new mothers for only a relatively brief period of 
time after the birth of a child.127  Generally, by the time a defendant 
has come to trial and been sentenced, the psychotic flare-up has 
passed and the defendant is no longer even in a treatment phase.128  
As a result, should such a defendant receive a GBMI verdict that 
carries a treatment phase followed by the rest of the sentence spent 
incarcerated, she would be shuttled directly to incarceration, 
making the end result not much different than simply being found 
guilty without a mental illness assessment. 
Placement in a treatment facility in general poses some 
challenges in the postpartum psychosis context.  On average, 
defendants “sentenced to mental facilities serve longer sentences in 
mental hospitals than do those who are found guilty and sentenced 
to prison.”129  These longer terms pose an interesting problem for 
defendants with postpartum psychosis.  On the one hand, women 
who suffer from postpartum psychosis invariably are charged with 
either killing or attempting to kill their child.  As a result, they are 
subject to longer prison terms, if not the death penalty, should they 
be convicted.  These consequences are greater than for many of 
the felony or misdemeanor charges and associated penalties that 
other defendants who raise the insanity defense face.  As a result, a 
longer period in a mental hospital might be preferable as opposed 
to the serious prison sentence should a murder charge stick. 
On the other hand, these women “pose a challenge” because 
postpartum psychosis is a relatively short-term disorder that is not a 
chronic condition.130  Women suffer from it only after the birth of a 
child, and when treated they experience a complete recovery after 
a short period of time.131  The psychosis does not recur until and 
unless they give birth to another child.  In this aspect, it is very 
 
 126. Liu, supra note 64, at 394. 
 127. Oberman, supra note 62, at 43. 
 128. Reece, supra note 49, at 751. 
 129. Oberman, supra note 62, at 43. 
 130. Id. 
 131. Id. 
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unlike most other psychoses because an additional episode is 
entirely predictable and linked to a specific physiological event, 
and the psychosis is “timed-out” in a sense.  Although the Yates case 
points to the dangers of not recognizing and treating the disorder, 
proper treatment at the first onset of the mental disorder 
effectively prevents future dangerousness and eliminates 
recidivism.  Also, society at large is not placed at risk by a woman 
with postpartum psychosis, because it generally affects only the 
woman involved and her child or children, and only after she has 
recently given birth.132  As a result, the dangerousness that justifies 
long-term incarceration in a mental hospital or in a prison is 
absent. 
3. A Hybrid Approach 
The special conditions that surround postpartum psychosis 
suggest a combination of requiring lighter sentencing provisions 
and a treatment program might best accomplish the goals of 
rehabilitation and retributivism without allowing postpartum 
defendants to fall through gaps in the system.  Lighter sentencing 
upon a showing that the defendant was suffering from postpartum 
psychosis, that the disorder caused her to kill her child(ren), but 
that she cannot make out a full insanity defense to meet the 
cognitive test, provides social retribution for wrongdoing but 
recognizes that control over that wrongdoing was not entirely in 
the hands of the defendant due to the disorder. 
The key difference between such a sentencing provision and 
statutes such as England’s Infanticide Act is requiring a causal link 
between the disorder and the offense.  In addition, putting such a 
defendant in a treatment facility rather than incarcerating her in 
prison during the time of her sentence recognizes her disorder 
rather than punishing her for events that, but for the disorder, 
would not have occurred.  The causal link requirement also helps 
counter the assimilative argument against different standards for 
men and women in the criminal law context because it does not 
presume that women should be treated differently, but that 
defendants who have postpartum psychosis should be treated 
differently. 
This combination of lighter sentencing and treatment facility 
 
 132. Reece, supra note 49, at 751. 
20
William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 32, Iss. 1 [2005], Art. 9
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol32/iss1/9
7MARCH_PAGINATED.DOC 11/17/2005  9:55:01 AM 
2005] POSTPARTUM PSYCHOSIS 263 
institutionalization is not a perfect solution.  The fact that women 
who have suffered from postpartum psychosis generally are 
improved, if not fully restored, by the time their case reaches a 
sentencing phase makes the treatment facility institutionalization 
seem a bit superfluous.  Yet, if such guidelines were followed, then 
the entire process would move more quickly, women could plead 
into this system, and they could receive the treatment needed for 
an appropriate time period. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Given the complex web of issues surrounding postpartum 
psychosis, including the basis for the disorder, the gender 
implications it carries, the problems that exist in conforming it to 
legal standards for insanity, and people’s suspicions about 
temporarily morbid psychotic disorders, it is unlikely that a perfect 
solution exists for the legal treatment of the disorder.  But the 
system as it exists now has failed for women such as Andrea Yates, 
who everyone—jurists, the prosecutor, and the public alike—
agreed was suffering from a mental instability due to postpartum 
psychosis at the time she killed her children.  A new system that 
creates some sort of carve-out for women suffering from 
postpartum psychosis creates no slippery slope of retributionist 
exclusion that would extend to a wide pool of criminal offenders.  
An acceptable solution is one that recognizes the unique nature of 
postpartum psychosis and resolves, at least in part, the problem of 
balancing treatment and punishment.  A hybrid of reduced 
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